Eurosystem debts do matter by Whittaker, John
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Eurosystem debts do matter
John Whittaker
Lancaster University
1 February 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69235/
MPRA Paper No. 69235, posted 5 February 2016 13:34 UTC
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MONETARY RESEARCH 
 
 
 
  John Whittaker 
  1 February 2016 
 
 
 
 
Eurosystem debts do matter 
 
Since September 2015, the European Central Bank has been publishing 
Target2 balances of the eurozone national central banks. But this presents an 
incomplete picture of intra-eurosystem debts because it does not include 
those arising from the issue of banknotes. 
 
The ECB also plays down the importance of Target2 debts as a “normal 
feature of the decentralised implementation of monetary policy in the euro 
area”. But if Greece were to leave the euro and its eurosystem debt (currently 
€114bn) were written off, other eurozone countries would bear the loss, in 
addition to losses on official loans.  
 
There is no effective mechanism for limiting eurosystem debts. And exit risk – 
the risk that Greece or some other eurozone country with large eurosystem 
debts will leave the euro – will always be present. 
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Intra-eurosystem debts
Target2 balances 
An essential feature of European monetary union is 
that each national central Bank (NCB) in the 
eurosystem can borrow from the others. This is 
necessary for clearing cross-border payments through 
the banking system. If a deposit is moved from a 
Greek bank to a German bank, for instance, the Greek 
bank makes up for its lost deposit by borrowing more 
from its NCB (the Bank of Greece, BoG); the current 
account of the German bank at its NCB (the 
Bundesbank) is credited; and the Bundesbank acquires 
a claim on the BoG. The accumulation of these debts 
between the NCBs are the Target2 balances which the 
ECB (2015) has now begun to publish. 
The broad features of the Target2 balances are that 
‘core’ countries such as Germany have claims, whilst 
the greatest liabilities are those of the ‘peripheral’ 
countries Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, largely 
caused by capital flows from the periphery to the core 
since 2008. Chart 1 shows the combined Target2 
liabilities of these countries, which reached a peak in 
mid-2012 then fell until mid-2014.  
It has been rising again since then, mainly driven by 
renewed flows out of Italy and Greece. 
 
Euro banknotes 
Cross-border payments can also be made by drawing 
banknotes from banks in one eurozone country and 
depositing them in another, and this is another source1 
of intra-eurosystem debts. Banks in each euro country 
obtain their banknotes from their NCB and, to account 
for cross-border movements, each NCB is allocated a 
                                                                                                                    
1 An NCB’s ‘banknote allocation key’ is 92% of its capital key 
with the remaining 8% allocated to the ECB. 
proportion of the total stock of eurozone-wide issue 
outstanding at any time, according to its share in the 
capital of the ECB (its ‘capital key’).1 If the value of 
banknotes issued by an NCB exceeds its allocation, this 
excess is recorded as a eurosystem liability; an NCB 
that has issued less than its allocation has a 
eurosystem claim. As an example, if €100 of 
banknotes is drawn in Greece and deposited in 
Germany, the total issue is unchanged and allocations 
are therefore unchanged, but Greece’s eurosystem 
liability rises by €100 while Germany’s claim rises by 
€100. 
The increase in a country’s eurosystem liability (or 
decrease in its claim) is thus equal to net cross-border 
out-payments via banks and banknote movements, 
which could be current account payments or capital 
outflows unrelated to trade.2  
 
Table 1. Intra-eurosystem claims 
December 2015                   € billions 
 
  
  banknote1 
 
    total as 
 
 
   Target2 adjustment total    % of GDP 
 Austria -29.2 28.2  -0.9 -0.3  
 Belgium -7.8 11.9  4.1 1.0  
 Finland 20.1 4.0  24.1 11.7  
 France -29.2 95.4 e 66.1 3.1  
 Germany 584.2 -297.8  286.4 9.8  
 Greece -94.4 -19.6  -114.0 -64.2  
 Ireland -3.0 -17.1 e -20.1 -10.6  
 Italy -248.9 32.3  -216.6 -13.4  
 Luxembourg 147.6 -92.7  54.9 112.3  
 Netherlands 54.7 45.8 e 100.5 15.2  
 Portugal -61.7 34.7  -27.0 -15.5  
 Spain -254.1 83.7  -170.4 -16.4  
 ECB -83.8 86.7  2.9    
 others 5.3 4.6 r 9.9    
 sum 0.0 0.0  0.0    
        
        
        
        
        
 
                                                                                                                    
2 The increase in a country’s eurosystem liability is 
identically equal to its overall balance of payments deficit, if 
the balance of payments is defined to include the current 
account and all capital flows excluding changes in the 
eurosystem balance of the NCB. Appendix 1 gives relevant 
accounting identities. 
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Chart1. 
Target2 liabilities of Italy, Spain, Portugal & Greece 
source: ECB Negative numbers indicate amounts owed to other NCBs. 
1An NCB with a negative banknote adjustment has issued a 
greater value of banknotes than its allocation. 
e = estimate; r = residual  
source: ECB (Target2); NCBs (banknote adjustment). 
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Table 1 shows current intra-eurosystem balances, 
including both Target2 balances and banknote 
adjustments.3 The banknote adjustments, which have 
built up more gradually since each country joined 
monetary union, make considerable differences to 
overall intra-eurosystem debts.4 For instance, 
Germany’s negative banknote adjustment offsets 
more than half of its Target2 claim.  
 
Risks 
Should Germany and the other creditor countries be 
concerned about their eurosystem exposures? If 
Greece left the euro and the BoG did not pay off its 
eurosystem debt, the resulting loss would be shared 
among the NCBs of the other euro countries in 
proportion to their capital keys.5 The Bundesbank has 
the largest capital key (25.6%) and so it would suffer 
the largest loss. All profits and losses of the 
Bundesbank accrue to the German government; 
hence, if the Bundesbank were to write off part of its 
eurosystem claim, this would be a loss for German 
taxpayers.6  
For these reasons, while eurosystem debts are 
formally debts between NCBs, they are properly 
considered as debts between respective governments. 
This applies to eurosystem debts arising from both 
payment channels: cross-border transfers via the 
banking system (Target2 debts) and payments via 
banknote movements, despite the fact that the ECB 
has chosen to publish only the Target2 component. 
The ECB (2015) plays down the importance of Target2 
debts (and, by implication, total intra-eurosystem 
debts of each country which include the banknote 
adjustment), describing them as a  
“normal feature of the decentralised implementation 
of monetary policy in the euro area.”  
                                                                                                                    
3 We disregard NCB claims on the ECB resulting from foreign 
assets transferred to the ECB (a total of €40.5 at end 2014, 
allocated across the NCBs according to their capital keys). 
4 Further discussion of the pattern of euro banknote issues 
and more detail of the accounting practices appear in 
Whittaker (2011). 
5 The eurosystem balances of NCBs are considered as 
liabilities to or claims against the ECB, but the shareholders 
of the ECB are the NCBs themselves. For a description of the 
accounting see, for instance, ECB Annual Report, December 
2014, page 124. 
6 Even in an uncooperative departure of a country from the 
euro, some recovery of its eurosystem liabilities might be 
expected. Legally, the ECB could seize the collateral security 
held by the NCB against its refinancing but this would be 
unlikely to cover more than a fraction of losses.  
Further, (ECB, 2013)7 
“- - the size of the TARGET balances does not pose 
additional risk to the Eurosystem or the NCBs given 
the irreversibility of the euro - -“ 
However, the euro is not irreversible. Indeed, we 
argue below that exit risk is an unavoidable feature of 
monetary union. Thus, if a country’s eurosystem debt 
presents a risk when it leaves the euro, and if there is 
a non-zero probability that it will leave, then its 
eurosystem debt is risky. A contingent risk is a risk.  
Eurosystem debts are a peculiar form of debt with no 
contract or understanding about the terms of 
repayment8. This implies that an NCB cannot default 
on its eurosystem liability because it has no obligation 
to repay.  
A country’s intra-eurosystem liabilities are 
nonetheless loans from other countries. For a country 
that has received official loans, its intra-eurosystem 
liabilities should therefore be added to its official 
loans when assessing the risk exposure of the creditor 
countries. 
 
Greece’s public debt 
As an example, the progress of the public debt of 
Greece since 2008 is shown in Chart 2, where we 
define public debt to include the eurosystem liabilities 
of the BoG, official loans to the Greek government and 
outstanding government bonds. Greece’s public debt 
to foreign governments, shown as the solid line, stood 
at €365bn in September 2015 (see also appendix 1)9. 
As a result of capital flight, the Target2 debt of the 
BoG had already reached €80bn by May 2010.Thus, 
the Greek state was already enjoying a ‘loan’ of €80bn 
from other eurozone governments via their NCBs, 
                                                                                                                    
7 Similar statements appear elsewhere, for instance 
Bundesbank (2011). 
8 This contrasts with the US where there is annual 
settlement of the inter-district balances of the Feds (Federal 
Reserve Banks), using Federal government debt or agency 
debt. The US system also differs from the eurosystem in that 
the Feds are not associated with states: each Fed deals with 
banks in several states and Fed profits go to the US 
government. Intra-eurosystem settlement would be 
infeasible because debtor NCBs do not have sufficient 
suitable assets. 
9 Note that official loans are reported at their nominal 
values, which is a poor indicator of their sustainability, given 
the reductions in interest rates and extensions of maturity. 
The ESM (annual report 2014, page 30) estimates that these 
concessions have reduced the NPV of EU loans to Greece by 
49% of 2013 GDP, which amounts to €89bn. 
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Chart 2. Greek public debt 
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1 'bonds' include all debt of the Greek government excluding official loans. 
2 'banknotes' refers to the liability of the Bank of Greece to the eurosystem arising from 
    banknote issue in excess of its allocation. 
3 The solid line is Greek public debt owed to foreign governments, consisting of 
    eurosystem debt, official loans and Greek government bonds at the ECB and other NCBs. 
4  In the debt restructuring of February-March 2012, the nominal value of privately held 
    Greek government debt was reduced by about €107bn. 
    source: Greek Ministry of Finance; Bank of Greece 
    Greek GDP (2014) = €178bn  
bonds restructured4 
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even before it received any 
official loans. Then in May 2010, 
Greece began to receive 
tranches of official loans under 
the first bailout programme 
from the EU and the IMF, which 
arrested the rise of the BoG’s 
Target2 debts. When the 
government of Greece receives a 
tranche of a loan, this capital 
inflow causes an equal reduction 
in the Target2 liability of the 
BoG, leaving the overall 
exposure of creditor 
governments to Greece 
unchanged (appendix 1). The 
debt merely becomes routed 
through the IMF or an EU fund 
(e.g. the European Financial 
Stability Fund) rather than 
through the NCBs.  
Private funds continued to leave 
Greece until mid- 2012, as rising 
yields on Greek government 
debt indicated fears of default 
and/or departure of Greece 
from the euro. A major 
component of the withdrawals 
was by foreign banks (see 
Merler, 2015). But instead of 
causing higher Target2 debt, those outflows were 
mostly offset by further inflows of official loans. At the 
same time, there was a marked rise in banknote issue 
by the BoG, for hoarding and/or as a means of sending 
funds out of the country.  
The outflows reversed in late 2012 following the ECB’s 
promise to purchase government debts (Outright 
Monetary Transactions, OMT, described below). This 
set the Target2 balances of all the peripheral countries 
on a downward path as private funds returned, 
responding to reduced fears of sovereign defaults and 
euro-exit. In April 2014, the Greek government was 
even able to issue €3bn of new 5-year debt at only 5% 
yield. 
From September 2014 to June 2015, the eurosystem 
debt of the BoG rose again as a result of capital 
outflows during the protracted negotiations between 
the Greek government and its creditors, while inflows 
of official loan funding ceased. 
 At the end of December 2015, BoG eurosystem debt 
was €114bn (close to the peak of €128bn in June 
2012), of which €20bn was a result of excess banknote 
issue. 
Limits to eurosystem debts 
The experiences of Greece and other peripheral 
eurozone countries since 2008 invite consideration of 
the mechanism that should have restrained the 
growth of intra-eurosystem debts. 
No central bank, in any monetary system, lends to its 
banks unsecured. In the eurosystem, the routine 
provision of liquidity by NCBs to banks (refinancing) is 
via repurchase agreements in which the NCB lends to 
banks against collateral approved by the ECB. But it is 
costly to tie up assets as collateral for NCB refinancing. 
Hence, this collateral framework should have given an 
incentive for banks requiring liquidity to seek cheaper 
borrowing in the interbank markets. 
This incentive appears to have been effective until 
2008 as Target2 balances across the eurozone 
remained generally small.10 Although there were 
sizable current account deficits in several peripheral 
                                                                                                                    
10 The ECB (2015) notes that total Target2 claims before 
mid-2007 were around €100bn; by mid-2012 they had risen 
to over €1,000bn. 
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countries, these were approximately matched by 
investment inflows and lending from core to 
peripheral banks (ECB, 2013).  
After 2008, the financial crisis brought substantial 
capital flight from the periphery to the core, while 
cross-border interbank markets dried up as a result of 
counterparty risk.11 As deposits were withdrawn from 
banks in the periphery and transferred to banks in the 
core, this led to increased liquidity provision by the 
peripheral NCBs, with corresponding reductions by the 
core NCBs (or increases in the core banks’ deposits at 
their NCBs). In turn, the periphery NCBs built up 
increasing Target2 debts to the core NCBs, which still 
largely persist (table 1). 
To enable the periphery NCBs to continue providing 
liquidity, the ECB’s collateral standards were 
progressively relaxed. Among the measures adopted, 
minimum credit ratings for government debt and 
other securities were reduced several times, banks 
own-issued bonds with a government guarantee were 
accepted, and very long maturity refinancing was 
offered under advantageous terms.12 
Instead of serving to restrain the growth of intra-
eurosystem balances, the rules for refinancing were 
eased as necessary to allow the balances to grow 
unhindered. When the quality of available collateral 
became so poor that further easing could no longer be 
justified, the ECB has always permitted NCBs to 
extend Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) where 
the NCB itself approves the collateral and the risk is 
purportedly borne by the NCB (and thereby the 
relevant government) rather than pooled via the 
ECB.13  
The ECB has always been keen to signal that 
permission for continuing ELA should not be taken for 
                                                                                                                    
11A recovery of the unsecured short-term interbank 
market is unlikely even as counterparty risk recedes, 
given the Basel III liquidity coverage rules (BCBS, 2013) 
which require banks to hold 100% statutory liquid assets 
against such borrowing  
12 The ECB also had to change to ‘full allotment’ (satisfying 
all banks’ demands for liquidity in full), because the ‘normal’ 
auction system in which supply was limited to net eurozone-
wide demand had relied on functioning interbank markets to 
distribute the liquidity. Sinn (2014) provides a thorough 
analysis of the eurosystem, including detail of the decline of 
collateral standards. 
13 The ECB’s ELA procedures permit temporary ELA to 
solvent banks, provided that this does not “interfere with the 
objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem”. This gives latitude 
for judgement and interpretation, as discussed by Whelan 
(2015). 
granted. For example, as deposits were withdrawn 
from Greek banks during the negotiations in 2015 over 
the third bailout, the ECB permitted the value of ELA 
granted by the BoG to rise in a series of small 
increments that were just sufficient to allow the banks 
to remain liquid. But the cap always stayed ahead of 
demand: it was never binding. 
Continuing liquidity support is necessary for countries 
to remain in monetary union (see appendix 2). 
Monetary union cannot be made to function as 
originally intended, with intra-eurosystem balances 
restrained by rigid rules governing central bank 
liquidity supply. 
 
Asset purchase programmes 
As this behaviour illustrates, the ECB has two 
conflicting objectives. On the one hand, it is supposed 
to allow NCB lending only to solvent banks and against 
high-quality collateral. On the other hand, it has a 
treaty responsibility ‘to promote the smooth 
operation of payment systems’14, which means the 
NCB lending tap must remain open. Irrespective of 
treaty commitments, the ECB would not welcome the 
political fallout if it caused a country to be expelled 
from the euro by failing to provide enough liquidity. 
Besides causing the ECB to relax its collateral 
standards, this dilemma gives the ECB an incentive to 
find ways of holding back the banks’ demand for 
liquidity, and its various asset purchase programmes 
may be seen in this light. Under the Securities Market 
Programme (SMP) of 2010-12, the NCBs bought over 
€200bn of peripheral government debt.15 In reducing 
sovereign yields, this should have helped to arrest 
capital flight, thereby holding back the demand for 
liquidity. In the event, any useful affects were 
transitory and yields and Target2 liabilities continued 
to rise. 
Then, at the height of crisis in mid-2012, the ECB 
President declared that the ECB would  
“do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”, 
later specified as a conditional promise to purchase 
government debt (named Outright Monetary 
Transactions: OMT), as necessary - - 
                                                                                                                    
14 Article 127(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
15 The SMP purchases were initially of the government debts 
of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, then later of Spain and 
Italy. The ECB has published details of holdings as at 31 
December 2012. 
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“to address severe distortions in government bond 
markets which originate from, in particular, 
unfounded fears on the part of investors of the 
reversibility of the euro.”16 
Asset purchases under this OMT programme, which 
would be essentially the same as SMP purchases, have 
never been carried out. However, the commitment to 
do so has been largely been given the credit for 
bringing down sovereign yields and reversing capital 
flight.17 
A new asset purchase programme began in March 
2015 which mostly consists of purchases by NCBs of 
their own government debt, up to a total of €60bn per 
month, spread across countries according to their 
capital keys. This is designed to provide economic 
stimulus and to raise inflation rates, emulating 
quantitative easing as practiced elsewhere. It also 
directly serves to reduce eurozone banks’ needs for 
liquidity.18 
 
Bailout loans 
What happens when lending by a country’s NCB to its 
banks becomes so large and/or the quality of the 
banks’ remaining collateral becomes so poor that the 
ECB finds it hard to justify continued lending, even via 
ELA? The official loan programmes for the 
governments of Greece (2010, 2012 and 2015), Ireland 
(2010), Portugal (2011) and Cyprus (2013) can be seen 
as an attempt to address this problem.19 
First, a large part of banks’ collateral typically 
consists of government debt and government-
guaranteed debt. The ECB used the commitment of 
                                                                                                                    
16 ECB press statement, 6 September 2012.ember 2012l 
17 Buchheit and Gulati (2012) have pointed out that, if an 
OMT purchase programme were ever commenced, there 
might not be enough political support to enable the 
programme to remain credible. 
18 ‘Monetary financing’ (central bank lending to 
governments) is prohibited by treaty (article 123 TFEU). 
However, all these actions are purchases by NCBs of 
government debts in the secondary markets which, in the 
case of OMT, has been condoned by the European Court of 
Justice. 
19 It is commonly argued that the motive for the 2010 Greek 
bailout was to save private creditors, particularly French and 
German banks (e.g. Mody, 2015). This is not inconsistent 
with the view that the purpose was to give the ECB cover for 
the continuation of liquidity provision, as both of these 
motives can be construed as preserving the fragile ‘financial 
stability’ of the eurozone. Davies (2015) notes that a default 
by the Greek government would have ruined Greek banks, 
which also had large holdings of Greek government debt. 
the above countries to the conditions of their loan 
programmes as a basis for condoning continued 
lending against these assets when sovereign ratings 
had been downgraded to ‘junk’. 
Second, by supporting government budgets (and 
banks), official loans should help to hold back capital 
flight and thereby restrain the banks’ demand for 
liquidity, in the same manner as the asset purchase 
programmes. 
Third, as noted above for the case of Greece, the 
receipt by a country of a tranche of a loan causes an 
equal reduction in lending by that country’s NCB to 
its banks, and in the Target2 liability of the NCB 
(appendix 1). 
In other words, official lending displaces lending via 
the eurosystem: one form of bailout is displaced by 
another. However, while official loans and lending via 
the eurosystem both represent exposure for the 
creditors, the important difference is that all official 
loan programmes have included ‘austerity’ conditions. 
These have invariably required budget deficit 
reduction (which the Stability Pact rules failed to 
deliver) and structural reforms intended to improve 
governance and competitiveness, with the payment of 
each loan tranche dependent on the continuing 
fulfillment of the conditions by the recipient 
government. 
The objective of these conditions can be seen as 
coercing governments to behave in ways that will 
enable them to repay the loans. 
But total borrowing from other eurozone 
governments, including official bailouts and 
eurosystem debt, can only fall as private funds flow in 
as a result of a current account surplus or inward 
investment.  
Even if the Greek government runs large budget 
surpluses which it uses to repay its official loans, this 
will merely cause an equal rise in its eurosystem 
(Target2) debt, unless the budget surpluses induce 
private financial inflows. 
While ‘austerity’ may be given the credit for turning 
round the Irish economy, the loan programmes for 
Greece have been notably unsuccessful and there has 
been mixed success elsewhere. The argument has 
been made (e.g. Varoufakis 2015) that austerity in 
Greece may have improved economic efficiency and 
budget balances, but that the dominant effect has 
been to depress economic activity and create political 
instability, making the repayment of loans less likely.  
The IMF has received repayment of its share of official 
loans as they have matured. However, there have 
6 
been no repayments so far of the larger loans from EU 
funds. Instead, the repayment terms for the EU loans 
to Ireland, Portugal and Greece have been 
considerably eased, both by reducing interest rates 
and pushing payback dates well into the future. The 
average residual maturity of EU funds lent to Greece 
under the first two loan programmes (€184bn) is now 
around 30 years (EFSF, 2015; ESM, 2014). 
The net result is that one form of lending that Greece 
has no obligation to repay (eurosystem liabilities) has 
been partially replaced by another where repayments 
are not due for 30 years (official loans). There is not 
much difference.  
 
The euro as a fixed exchange rate regime 
If Greece had kept its own currency (drachma) and 
fixed its exchange rate to the euro, the outflow of 
foreign (euro) reserves from the BoG would long ago 
have forced it to abandon the fix. 
But under monetary union, the ‘fix’ (of the value of 
euros in banks in one country to those in another) is 
maintained by the commitment of all NCBs to accept 
unlimited intra-eurosystem claims against each other. 
A country’s NCB does not need to be concerned about 
keeping ‘foreign’ reserves to maintain its fixed 
exchange rate, because other NCBs automatically lend 
to it as necessary. 
This structure has a problem. When a country fixes its 
currency against some different currency, its 
government has an incentive to avoid policies such as 
large budget deficits that lead to financial outflows 
and the depletion of its central bank’s foreign 
reserves. In monetary union, this incentive is absent as 
there is no corresponding limit to the growth of 
eurosystem balances. 
In its place, eurosystem liabilities should have been 
restrained by the collateral requirements for NCB 
lending to banks but, as discussed above, these 
requirements have always been diluted as necessary 
to allow NCB lending to continue, or lending has been 
allowed via ELA. And the Stability Pact rules which 
should have restricted budget deficits have not been 
consistently applied. For those countries that have 
received official loans, the ‘austerity’ conditions 
attempt to reproduce the incentive for prudent fiscal 
behaviour which exists naturally under a fixed regime. 
In the absence of effective restraints on the rise of 
eurosystem liabilities, there is nonetheless a 
disciplining force. That is the threat of expulsion from 
monetary union. A fixed exchange rate breaks when 
the country defending it runs out of foreign reserves; 
monetary union breaks when the country is denied 
eurosystem credit. 
 
Exit risk 
The departure of any country from monetary union 
would involve large political and financial costs and 
uncertainty, particularly for that country but also for 
other eurozone members, given the absence of 
agreed exit procedures. This makes monetary union 
more durable than a fixed rate regime between 
separate currencies.  
Yet, there must be a limit to the tolerance of creditor 
countries. There must be some threshold level of 
exposure to Greece or any other debtor country, or 
expected future exposure, beyond which Germany 
and the other creditors would refuse further credit 
either via the eurosystem or official loans, accept their 
losses, and expel.  
Despite the ECB’s assertion that monetary union is 
irreversible, exit risk will always be present, just as it is 
in any ordinary fixed exchange rate regime. The 
difference with monetary union is that it raised the 
stakes by in cementing all financial claims into a 
‘foreign’ currency. 
The Greek government knows this. Indeed, the fear of 
being deprived of ELA and forced out of the euro was 
the main reason why it accepted the conditions 
attached to the latest bailout. Likewise, it was the 
threat to cut ELA that persuaded the Irish government 
to accept an official loan programme in November 
201020 and the Cypriot government to accept a 
programme in March 2013. 
Exit risk for Greece has receded since the agreement 
of August 2015. And exit risk for other countries is 
lower than it was in 2012 thanks to the OMT promise 
and, more recently, the latest asset purchase 
programme. 
But exit risk has not gone away. The next country to 
see rising exit risk, along with accelerated capital flight 
and higher sovereign yield spreads, might not be 
Greece. It could be any of the peripheral eurozone 
countries which still have large eurosystem liabilities 
and government debts relative to GDP, ongoing 
concerns about their banks and uncertain politics. 
 
                                                                                                                    
20 In letters to the Irish government in November 2010, the 
ECB explicitly threatened to cut liquidity to Irish banks unless 
the Irish government agreed to a programme of financial 
support. 
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Appendix 1: The public debt of Greece to foreign governments: accounting identities 
 
We are interested in the exposure of foreign 
governments to Greek ‘public debt’, defined as the 
debts of both the government and the BoG. Then, as 
illustrated in Figure 1: 
Equation (1) 
Public debt of Greece to foreign governments   (A) 
Greek government bonds held by the ECB 
 and other NCBs1                                   (B) 
= +  outstanding EU and IMF loans to 
               the Greek government                       (C) 
 +  the eurosystem liability of the BoG 
 (owed to the ECB)                       (D)  
where the debt to the ECB is included because the ECB 
is owned by NCBs and the profits and losses of each 
NCB accrue to its government. 
 
The balance of payments identity 
An increase in the eurosystem liability of the BoG, 
(arising both from bank transfers and banknote 
movements) is equal to the overall balance of 
payments deficit, which may be decomposed as: 
Equation (2) 
Increase in eurosystem liability of the BoG       (ΔD) 
net private financial outflows 
 +  repayments less receipts of loans         (–ΔC) 
= +  net redemptions of ECB-held Greek 
                government bonds       (–ΔB) 
 +  interest on public debt to foreign govts 
where private financial outflows comprise current 
account payments and capital outflows2 unrelated to 
trade, including private transactions in securities.
Equations (1) and (2) imply: 
Equation (3) 
Increase in public debt to foreign govts             (ΔA) 
interest on this debt 
 +  net private financial outflows 
These identities show: 
1. Capital flight from Greece: 
Capital flight (net private outflows) causes an increase 
in borrowing of the BoG through the eurosystem 
(ECB), unless this is offset by official loans to the 
government (eqn. 2). In other words, private exposure 
to Greece is converted into exposure of other 
governments to Greece through the eurosystem. 
2. Repayment of Greek public debt to foreign 
governments: 
Barring default or forgiveness, the total of Greek 
public debt to foreign governments can only be 
reduced by private financial inflows, i.e. by current 
account surpluses or net inward investment (eqn.3). 
In the absence of private financial flows, the 
redemption of a Greek government bond held by the 
ECB or the repayment of a loan to the EU or the IMF 
causes an identical increase in the eurosystem 
(Target2) debt of the BoG to the ECB (eqn. 2). The 
same applies to payments of interest on ECB-held 
government bonds and official loans. 
 
1 Bonds purchased under the SMP programme. 
2 ‘Capital flows’, as used herein, include both the ‘capital 
account’ and the ‘financial account’ of the balance of 
payments as named under the accounting practices of 
the EU and the IMF.
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Figure 1: Greek public debt to foreign governments, September 2015. € billions 
*excludes loan from Bank of Greece and repo borrowing from ‘government entities’. 
Source: Bank of Greece; Greek Ministry of Finance; author estimates 
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Appendix 2: The meaning of ‘in the euro’ 
 
In considering exit risk – the risk that some country 
will leave the euro – it is helpful to clarify what defines 
a country as being ‘in the euro’ or ‘in monetary union’. 
Any country can use the euro as its currency without 
being a member of monetary union, existing examples 
being Kosovo and Montenegro. The ability of these 
‘euroised’ countries to use euro banknotes and to 
make foreign payments depends on their central 
banks keeping sufficient stocks of foreign assets, the 
same condition that would apply if these countries 
had their own currencies but held a fixed exchange 
rate against the euro. 
The distinguishing feature for a country that is a  
member of monetary union is that its national central 
bank (NCB), on behalf of its banks, can obtain 
banknotes and make foreign payments by borrowing 
from the ECB and other NCBs in the eurosystem. We 
shall therefore take this is the necessary and sufficient 
condition for a country to be in monetary union: that 
its banks have access, via its NCB, to eurosystem 
credit. 
However, while NCB borrowing from the eurosystem 
is unconditional, the NCB’s supply of liquidity to its 
banks (by refinancing or ELA) is subject to collateral 
requirements. The implication is that a bank would 
have to close if its liquidity need were greater than the 
value (after haircuts) of its stock of eligible collateral 
assets.  
In principle, NCB liquidity could be withdrawn from an 
individual bank without implication for membership of 
monetary union for the country in which the bank 
resides. However, during the financial crisis, all banks 
in certain eurozone countries lost deposits due to 
capital flight, and continued membership of monetary 
union meant that they all needed more NCB-supplied 
liquidity. To meet that general need, the collateral 
rules were weakened and ceilings on liquidity supply 
were raised as necessary. Despite several occasions on 
which the ECB has threatened to restrict liquidity 
supply, it has always been sufficient to meet demand.
Granted, at the end of the recent Greek negotiations, 
this was only achieved with the aid of capital controls. 
When the Greek government called a referendum on 
the bailout package on 27 June 2015, the ECB declined 
Greek requests for further increases in the ELA ceiling. 
The Greek authorities than declared a bank holiday 
during which cash withdrawals from ATMs and foreign 
payments were still permitted but under strict limits. 
This held back capital flight enough for the demand for 
liquidity to stay below the ceiling. The liquidity tap 
remained open and Greece has stayed in the euro.1 
If the BoG had reached the ECB-imposed ceiling on its 
ELA, the only liquidity that the BoG would have been 
able to supply to the banks would have been claims 
against itself (new drachma) with no guarantee of 
convertibility into euros2. And the only way that banks 
could have met all demands for deposit withdrawal – 
the only way to stay open – would have been by using 
the new currency. Whatever the precise arrangements 
to issue new banknotes and to redenominate claims 
into the new currency, Greece would no longer be in 
monetary union. 
To sum up, if a country is ‘in the euro’, this requires 
the supply of eurosystem credit to its banks to be 
determined by demand. Conversely, if a country loses 
access to eurosystem credit, it is expelled from the 
euro. 
                                                                                                                    
1 This illustrates (as in the case of Cyprus in 2013) that a 
country can remain in monetary union with capital controls 
in place. However, with capital controls, euro deposits in 
Greek banks would tend to be less valuable than euro 
deposits in banks elsewhere, just as capital controls under a 
fixed exchange rate regime lead to an informal foreign 
exchange market in which the exchange rate may differ 
from the official rate. 
2 We disregard the possibility that the BoG might defy the 
ECB and supply euro liquidity to its banks in excess of the 
ceiling, on the presumption that the ECB and other NCBs 
would then restrict the BoG’s access to eurosystem credit, 
implying non-settlement of cross-border payments and non-
supply of euro banknotes to the BoG. This would force the 
BoG to restrict liquidity to its banks, which is the same 
outcome as if the BoG had adhered to the ceiling. 
